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Impact of recycling policies on plastic waste aimed at 








This study investigates the impact of the central government's policy designed to 
encourage municipalities to recycle plastic waste in Japan. Using an instrumental variable 
approach, we examine whether the Containers and Packaging Recycling Law (CPRL), 
which includes policies such as subsidising recycling for municipalities and providing 
municipalities with recyclers, increases the volume of plastic waste recycling in these 
municipalities. The results show that CPRL increases the recycling volume of plastic 
packaging waste, post collection, by approximately 3.1–3.9 kg per capita and that of 
plastic bottles by 0.4–0.5 kg per capita. We also find evidence that these estimated 
impacts of CPRL are larger than those of recycling policies that target inhabitants such 
as unit-based pricing and door-to-door collection. In contrast to previous studies, our 
results suggest that, in addition to policies for promoting recycling behaviour among 
inhabitants, policies designed to encourage municipalities play an important role in 
increasing the volume of plastic recycling.  
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Environmental pollution caused by plastic waste has become a critical global issue, 
and there is growing concern about the proper processing and disposal of plastics in many 
countries (Rochman et al. 2013; Jambeck et al. 2015; Huang et al. 2020). Additionally, 
increasing restrictions on plastic waste imports, particularly in Asian countries, have led 
governments worldwide to develop policies for the domestic recycling of plastic waste. 
Countries in the European Union (EU), for instance, aim to make all plastic packaging in 
the EU market recyclable by 2030 (European Commission 2018). Similarly, Japan aims 
to reuse or recycle all plastic waste by 2035 (Japanese Ministry of the Environment 2018). 
A number of studies have already demonstrated that some waste management policies, 
such as unit-based pricing (UBP) and door-to-door collection, are effective in promoting 
recycling behaviour among inhabitants (Bucciol et al. 2015; D’Amato et al. 2016; 
Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2017; Heller and Vatn 2017; Ek and Miliute-Plepiene 2018).  
However, there are serious concerns surrounding recycling plastic waste, and it is 
unlikely to be a preferred solution for public policy, as recycling creates additional costs. 
Local governments hesitate to implement plastic waste recycling because of the concern 
that collection and recycling costs will increase (Porter 2002; Kinnaman et al. 2014; 
Gradus et al. 2017). For instance, Kinnaman et al. (2014) suggest that average social costs 
are minimised with recycling rates well below observed and mandated levels in Japan. 
Indeed, in the Japanese context, plastic bottles collected for recycling are traded to 
recyclers for a reverse fee, which means that the municipality must pay a disposal fee for 
their collected plastic bottles to recyclers. Moreover, local governments would have to 
find recyclers to recycle collected plastic waste sustainably and legally in their own 
country, implying greater opportunity costs. Although in such cases policies to promote 
recycling improve the behaviour of inhabitants, it would be limited in its ability to 
motivate municipal governments, which are financially responsible for recycling. 
Consequently, the amount of plastic waste recycled after collection may not improve 
much, even if inhabitants take action to sort their waste. Such as the waste problem, 
therefore, when the emitter and processor of environmental pollution are different, a 
policy with regulations and incentives towards, not only emitter, processor might be a 
significant role in improving environmental pollution. 
This study investigates the impact of the Containers and Packaging Recycling Law 
(CPRL) designed to encourage municipalities to recycle plastic waste in Japan. The 
policy shock generated by CPRL provides an opportunity to test whether direct policy 
interventions by the central government that are targeted at municipalities, such as 
subsidising recycling and providing suitable recyclers to municipalities, increase the 
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recycling volume at the municipality level. We offer estimates for the causal impacts of 
CPRL on the recycling volume of plastic waste using a panel dataset of all 1,718 Japanese 
municipalities for 2007–2018 and an instrumental variables (IV) strategy.  
This study contributes to the literature on the policy impacts on recycling in several 
ways. While there are numerous studies that investigated the impact of policies on 
household recycling at the home separation and collection stages (Kinnaman and 
Fullerton 2000; Jenkins et al. 2003; Allers and Hoeben 2010; Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2014; 
Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2017; Heller and Vatn 2017; Ek and Miliute-Plepiene 2018), the 
impact of policies aimed at promoting recycling by municipalities has been unexplored. 
Brouwer et al. (2018) and Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2020) explored the impact of post-
collection separation on the amount of waste recycled. They found that separated plastic 
waste post-collection was of higher quality than household-separated plastic waste. Usui 
et al. (2015) examined the motivation of municipalities for implementing waste collection 
for recycling. The authors reported that the existence of waste treatment facilities, such 
as refuse-derived fuel facilities and self-owned landfill sites, determines a municipality’s 
decision-making on the collection and separation of waste. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, the effectiveness of the central government’s policies aimed at municipalities 
for recycling volume has not been previously examined.  
Additionally, this study investigated the policy effects that vary according to the types 
of plastic materials, including those traded for a fee or a reverse fee. While previous 
studies have not focused on the transaction price of waste in post-collection, by using a 
detailed dataset for each type of plastic waste, this study allows an investigation into the 
policy effects according to the types of plastic materials with different transaction prices. 
Our results suggest that even accounting for trading collected plastic bottles for a reverse 
fee, the CPRL policy increases the recycling volume of plastic waste by local 
municipalities. 
Second, based on an empirical analysis, this is the first study to find that recycling 
policy based on extended producer responsibility (EPR) promotes plastic recycling by 
municipal governments and improves recycling volume. The Japanese government 
established CPRL based on the EPR, which obliges the producer that manufactures, uses, 
or imports containers and packaging to pay commissioning fees based on its recycling 
output. How EPR affects post-collection recycling of plastic waste is important to 
understand the environmental impact throughout the life cycle of the product. Previous 
studies have focused mainly on the impact of EPR instruments on social welfare and 
incentives for the eco-design of products, based on theoretical models (Runkel 2003; 
Fleckinger and Glachant 2010; Brouillant and Oltra 2012). However, it is unclear how 
the EPA would actually work for plastic waste recycling at the waste management stage. 
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Finally, this study provides a methodological contribution to address waste 
management policy endogeneity by using IV strategy and performing a rigorous 
robustness check of the estimation results. In our context, reverse causation is a concern 
because the choice of policies is not exogenous when the CPRL is implemented in 
municipalities where a large amount of plastic waste is expected to be recycled. To 
address endogeneity concerns, in this study, motivated by Ichinose et al. (2015), we 
propose the use of the CPRL implementation rate of the previous year in the prefecture, 
to which each municipality belongs, as an instrumental variable for CPRL 
implementation.1  
To summarise our main findings, after dealing with the potential problem of 
endogeneity, there is a significant positive effect of CPRL on the recycling volume of 
plastic waste in municipalities. Other things being equal, the results show that the 
introduction of CPRL increases the amount of plastic packaging waste recycling by 3.1–
3.9 kg per capita and that of plastic bottle recycling by 0.4–0.5 kg per capita. These policy 
impacts are larger than those realised by other policies, such as UBP, door-to-door 
collection, and inter-municipal recycling cooperation. Further, the subsidies for 
municipal governments, based on the recycling volume and the quality of the collected 
plastic waste, increases the volume of plastic packaging waste recycling. These results 
suggest that while it is important to have policies aimed at motivating residents, policies 
aimed at municipal governments are also crucial in increasing plastic waste recycling.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the background 
of CPRL and Japanese waste management systems. Section 3 introduces the empirical 
strategy, model specifications, and data. Section 4 provides the estimation results. Section 
5 contains an array of robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and 





To examine the relationship between CPRL and recycling volume, we focus on two 
types of plastic waste material: plastic packaging waste and plastic bottles. In Japan, as 
of 2019, 8.5 million tons of plastic waste were being generated annually (Plastic Waste 
Management Institute in Japan 2020). Plastic containers and packaging waste, including 
plastic packaging waste and plastic bottles, are the highest contributor, accounting for 
46.8% of the total plastic waste. In addition, 4.12 million tons of plastic waste are 
generated annually in the form of MSW, and plastic containers and packaging waste 
account for 77.2% of the total MSW. However, while the material recycling rates for 
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glass bottles and paper have been raised to 67.6% and 64.4%, respectively,2,3 the material 
recycling rate for plastic waste is still merely 22%.  
In response to the problem of recycling plastic waste, in 1997, the Japanese government 
adopted the CPRL based on EPR to encourage municipalities’ domestic recycling efforts. 
This law targets packaging waste including plastic packaging waste, plastic bottles, glass 
bottles, and paper packaging containers in MSW, and each municipality can decide to 
apply the CPRL to each type of waste.4  In addition, municipalities collect and treat 
packaging waste from the MSW and are financially responsible for the costs associated 
with it.  
The CPRL has two policies to encourage municipalities to recycle plastic waste. First, 
the central government finds recyclers to sell the plastic waste collected by municipalities 
instead of the municipalities having to find their own recyclers. Under the CPRL, the 
municipalities sell the collected waste through competitive bidding by recycling 
companies selected by the central government. As of 2018, 56 recycling companies were 
participating in CPRL, and they were obliged to engage in domestic recycling and re-
commercialise container and packaging waste purchased from municipalities. Therefore, 
CPRL allows the municipalities implementing it to reduce their opportunity cost of 
finding recyclers that engage in domestic recycling.  
The second point is the issuance of subsidies by the central government in accordance 
with municipalities’ volume and quality of plastic waste recycling.5 In 2008, the Japanese 
government implemented an amendment to CPRL, allowing municipalities to obtain 
subsidies based on the recycling volume and quality of container and packaging waste. 
These subsidies are financed by the recycling fees obtained from producers, who are 
responsible for recycling packaging waste collected by municipalities into new products. 
Under the CPRL based on EPR, the producer that manufactures, uses, or imports 
containers and packaging is obliged to pay commissioning fees based on its recycling 
output. 
To decide the value of subsidy, the central government, unannounced, inspects the 
quality of each type of plastic waste in almost all municipalities implementing CPRL and 
gives them a ranking from A to D, with A ranking indicating the highest quality, and D 
ranking indicating the lowest. Under the subsidy policy, if recycling companies’ recycling 
costs are lower than originally expected, half of the lower amount is distributed to the 
municipality as a subsidy based on the rank, and the other half is distributed to the 
recyclers. Therefore, municipalities have an incentive to increase the recycling volume 
and the quality of plastic waste. 
Importantly, the central government cannot force the municipalities to implement this 
law; therefore, some municipalities either sell to recyclers that they have identified 
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independently or incinerate plastic waste as combustible waste at self-owned facilities. 
The reason for this is the downward trend in the transaction price of plastic waste. For 
instance, in the municipalities that enforced this law, the average transaction price of 
plastic packaging waste was 62,751 yen (567.74 US$)/ton in 2009, but it decreased to 
50,105 yen (453.33 US$)/ton in 2018.6 The plastic bottles are traded for a reverse fee that 
requires municipalities to pay the recycling company for disposal costs. The average 
transaction price of plastic bottles was minus 4,166 yen (37.69 US$)/ton in 2009, but it 
decreased to minus 33,408 yen (302.26 US$)/ton in 2018. Therefore, some municipalities 
do not implement CPRL if they can deal independently with a recycler buying plastic 
waste at a high price; however, in such a case, the plastic waste might be exported 
overseas. Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of CPRL implementation for each type 
of plastic waste in 2018. The municipalities enforcing the CPRL are spread across most 
of Japan. Figure 2 shows the state of CPRL adoption in municipalities for plastic 
packaging waste and plastic bottles as of 2018. Different municipalities adopted the 
CPRL in different periods. The trend in the adoption rate decreased significantly in 2005 
because of municipal mergers. As of 2018, 64% of Japanese municipalities had 
introduced plastic packaging waste systems, and 70% had introduced systems for plastic 
bottle recycling. These rates have been gradually increasing for several years.  
Some municipalities attempt to increase their recycling volume through policies other 
than the CPRL, as each municipality typically implements MSW management in its own 
jurisdiction. Some municipalities implement door-to-door collection in the collection 
process, whereby households place plastic waste in a clear bag in front of their home. The 
door-to-door collection has an incentive for households to separate the recyclable waste 
and improve the cleanliness of their plastic waste. For instance, based on Italian data, 
Bucciol et al. (2015) found that door-to-door collection increases the sort-to-total waste 
ratio by 15.7%. Previous studies have shown that, in the home separation stage, UBP has 
reduced waste and incentivised households to separate waste for recycling (Dijkgraaf and 
Gradus 2017). The share of Japanese municipalities introducing UBP systems has 
increased from 53% in 2007 to 61% in 2018 (Ministry of Environment 2018). In the 
treatment process, some municipalities implement inter-municipal cooperation for 
recycling with neighbouring municipalities. These economies of scale achieved through 
cooperation might reduce treatment costs and increase waste recycling efficiency (Callan 








Model specifications and data 
 
The aim of our analysis is to estimate the effect of CPRL on the amount of plastic waste 
recycled in the post-collection stage. We use municipal-level panel data from 2007 to 
2018 and 20,616 observations corresponding to all 1,718 municipalities over a period of 
12 years. Although the CPRL was introduced in 1997, because of data limitations and 
municipal mergers, a dataset from 2007 onwards was used. This is reasonable, as the 
number of municipalities has decreased by approximately 44% from 1997 to 2006 owing 
to several municipal mergers.7  Municipal mergers are strategic and non-random and 
cause an attrition bias problem that weakens the reliability of the related panel data 
(Wooldridge 2002; Ichinose et al. 2015; Usui et al. 2015). Indeed, since the adoption rate 
of CPRL decreased significantly in 2005 because of municipal mergers, the estimation 
including these periods would cause an attrition bias problem (Figure 2).  
Our sample is suitable for analysing the relationship between adopting CPRL and the 
recycling volume of plastic waste. First, the dataset merges the state of policy introduction 
by year with all municipality-by-year panels on the volume of recycled plastic waste for 
2007–2018, allowing the estimation of causal effects of CPRL. Second, the detailed and 
standardised data reported annually by the Japanese central government enable us to 
analyse the effect of CPRL on recycling volume at the post-collection stage. Moreover, 
with detailed data for subsidies for each type of plastic waste material, we estimate the 
impact of subsidies for municipal governments on the quantity of recycled plastic waste. 
Finally, the Japanese municipal solid waste (MSW) management exhibits large 
differences across municipalities and periods in terms of waste generation, disposal, 
recycling, and waste management policies, such as UBP and door-to-door collection. 
These conditions also allow a comparison of the policy effects between CPRL and other 
recycling policies. 
For the preliminary analysis, Figure 3 shows the differences between the CPRL 
implementing and non-implementing municipalities’ average recycling volume per capita 
for each type of waste. The graphs also show predictive linear regression lines with 95% 
confidence intervals. The plastic packaging waste depicted in Panel (a) reveals that the 
recycling volume, on average, was 4.4 kg per capita in the subsample of municipalities 
with CPRL, compared to 2.6 kg per capita in the subsample of municipalities without 
CPRL. This difference, 1.8 kg per capita, is statistically significant at the 1% level. As 
showed in Panel (b), the average recycling volume of plastic bottles in municipalities with 
CPRL is 2.2 kg per capita, which is 0.2 kg larger than that in municipalities without 
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CPRL; the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. Panel (c) compares the 
recycling volume of glass bottles and shows that the recycling volume is 0.2 kg per capita 
higher in municipalities with CPRL; this difference is statistically insignificant. Finally, 
as showed by the data on paper container waste in Panel (d), the evidence on the 
difference is less clear. The evidence provided in Figure 3 is suggestive. As mentioned in 
the previous section, while plastic waste makes up an important share of MSW, the 
recycling rate is considerably lower than that of glass bottles and paper waste. Therefore, 
recycling policies for plastic containers and packaging waste such as CPRL are likely to 
improve plastic waste recycling.  
Our working hypothesis is that the implementation of CPRL in municipalities increases 
the recycling volume. First, we estimate the amount of recycled plastic waste per capita 
as a function of the recycling system. We include the municipality-specific control that 
corresponds closely to the set of factors typically analysed in studies on recycling 
volumes (Ek and Miliute-Plepiene 2018; Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2020) as follows: 
 
!!,#,$ = #%$%&'!,#,$ +	#&*+,-!,$ +	#'./065!,$ + #(3,4!,$ + 5! + 6$ + 7!,$ ,														(1) 
 
where !!,#,$ is the recycled plastic amount in kilograms (kg) of waste type w per capita 
of municipality i in year t. The waste type w includes plastic packaging waste and plastic 
bottles. $%&'!,#,$  is the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for a municipality 
implementing CPRL in waste type w. Dens is the population density, Old65 is the share 
of older people (over 65 years old), and Inc is the average income per capita. 5! is the 
municipality fixed effect, 6$ is the year fixed effect, and 7!$ is the error term.  
Additionally, following previous studies, we estimate alternative models and include 
other policy variables expected to affect the amount of plastic waste recycling. In the 
second model, the investigation focused on which policy is more effective for recycling 
plastic waste. The equation now becomes 
 
!!#$ = #%$%&'!,#,$ +	#&*+,-!,$ +	#'./065!,$ + #(3,4!,$ + #)<=+>!,#,$ +	#*?@%!,$
+	#+*AA=!,#,$ + #,$AAB+!,$ + 5! + 6$ + 7!,$ ,																																								(2) 
 
where <=+> is the frequency of curbside collection of plastic waste w per month. Several 
studies suggested that a higher collection frequency of recyclable waste increases the 
amount of these materials (Abbot et al. 2011; Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2017; Dijkgraaf and 
Gradus 2020). As of 2018, plastic packaging waste and plastic bottles were collected at 
the curbside, on average, twice a month (Japanese Ministry of the Environment 2018). 
UBP is an indicator that equals 1 if a given municipality implements a UBP system for 
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burnable waste; otherwise, it equals 0. UBP provides an incentive for households to sort 
plastic waste (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2017). Thus, it is expected that municipalities with 
UBP collect more unpriced plastic waste. Conversely, there is potential for an indirect 
effect on the total recycling quantity in the event of a reduction in product consumption 
(Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2014). *AA= is a dummy variable that equals 1 for a municipality 
implementing the door-to-door collection of waste type w. As door-to-door collection 
requires households to place plastic waste in a clear bag outside their home, it is expected 
that municipalities with door-to-door collection will collect higher-quality waste (Bucciol 
et al. 2015). $AAB+ is a dummy variable that equals 1 for a municipality that implements 
inter-municipal cooperation with neighbouring municipalities in the recycling process. 
As stated earlier, the implementation of inter-municipal cooperation is expected to 
increase the recycling volume because of economies of scale. Table 1 presents the 
summary statistics of the data.  
Data on the status of CPRL implementation in municipalities from 2007 to 2018 were 
obtained from the Japan Containers and Packaging Recycling Association’s website 
(n.d.). These data were matched to recycling volume data on plastic packaging waste and 
plastic bottles waste in the post-collection stage by municipalities from an annual survey 
report on MSW by the Japanese Ministry of Environment from 2007 to 2018. Data on the 
implementation status of UBP, door-to-door collection, inter-municipal cooperation, 
frequency of curbside collection, and population data in each municipality were also 
extracted from an annual survey report on MSW by the Japanese Ministry of Environment. 
Data on population density and share of older people in each municipality were obtained 
from the 2005, 2010, and 2015 National Census of the Japanese Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications for the respective years. Data on the annual average income 
per capita by municipalities were obtained from the e-Stat database of the Official 
Statistics of Japan. These data were also matched to recycling volume data by 
municipalities in each year. 
 
Instrumental variables strategy 
 
We address the possible endogeneity of CPRL implementation using an IV strategy in 
the empirical analysis. Municipalities might implement CPRL if a large amount of plastic 
waste recycling is expected in their administrative area. Therefore, it is difficult to 
determine whether it is the intervention from the central government through CPRL or 
other underlying characteristics of the municipality that increase recycling volume. In this 
case, the OLS estimator will produce biased estimates because the variable capturing 
whether the municipality implements the CPRL is likely to be correlated with the error 
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term. To deal with the potential problem of endogeneity, in this study, we propose the use 
of the CPRL implementation rate of the previous year in the prefecture, to which each 
municipality belongs, as an instrumental variable for CPRL implementation. This 
instrumental variable is motivated by a study by Ichinose et al. (2015), who found that 
Japanese municipalities belonging to the same prefecture tend to implement similar waste 
management policies. Therefore, we assume that the correlation between the state of the 
policy in other municipalities belonging to the same prefecture in the previous year and 
CPRL implementation in the municipality is robust. The assumption is that the CPRL 
implementation rate in the previous year in the prefecture to which each municipality 
belongs is not caused by the amount of recycled plastic waste in each municipality, and 
it does not directly affect the outcome variables. The first-stage equation takes the 
following form: 
 
$%&'!,#,$ = D%+=E-,#,$.% + FG!,$ + 5! + 6$ + 7!,$ ,																																																	(3) 
 
where $%&'!,#,$ is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if municipality i implements CPRL 
for waste type w. %+=E-,#,$.% is the rate of CPRL implementation for waste type w in 
prefecture j in year t-1. The vector G!,$ contains other potential variables that may play a 
role in selecting a municipality implementing CPRL, which corresponds to the variable 
in the second-stage regression (as outlined above). 5! is the municipality fixed effect, and 
6$ is the year fixed effect. 7!$ is the error term, which contains unobservable factors that 
can be related to the implementation of CPRL, to the recycling outcomes, or to both. 
Tables 2 and 3 report the first-stage results for each type of waste. Column (1) includes 
only the variable of the CPRL implementation rate in the previous year in the prefecture 
to which each municipality belongs. Column (2) adds the municipality-specific control 
variables. Columns (3)–(6) add the policy variables, including frequency of curbside 
collection, door-to-door collection, UBP, and inter-municipal cooperation for recycling.  
In the results for plastic packaging waste in Table 2, the CPRL implementation rate of 
the prefecture is statistically significant at the 1% level in all models. These results 
indicate that CPRL implementation in the municipality tends to be influenced by other 
municipalities belonging to the same prefecture, which is in line with the findings of 
Ichinose et al. (2015). Table 3 represents the results for plastic bottles. The CPRL 
implementation rate of the prefecture is also positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level in all models. Based on these first-stage results, the identification assumptions 
are as follows: the amount of recycled plastic waste in each municipality does not depend 
on the implementation of CPRL in the previous year among other municipalities 
belonging to the same prefecture. The state of CPRL implementation in the previous year 
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in other municipalities belonging to the same prefecture does not directly affect the 
recycling volume of plastic waste in each municipality. The frequency of curbside 
collection, UBP, and inter-municipal cooperation in the recycling process are other 
potential instruments. These variables in I!,$ cannot be excluded from the second stage 






The impact of CPRL on plastic waste recycling 
 
For the first part of the analysis, we assess the impact of the plastic recycling policy 
aimed at municipalities by the central government’s introduction of CPRL. Tables 4 and 
5 report the estimation results for plastic packaging waste and plastic bottles by ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimations with the VCE robust estimator to correct for clustered 
standard errors, which considers the correlation of error terms between municipality 
clusters. All regressions include fixed effects for each municipality and time-specific 
dummies. The results for glass bottles and paper packaging containers are shown in 
Appendix A. 
Beginning with the first specification, in Table 4, Column (1), which includes no 
control variables, presents the CPRL implementation as associated with an increase in the 
recycling output of plastic packaging waste. Even if municipality control variables are 
included in the model (Column 2), it does not change the estimated CPRL effect. CPRL 
is statistically significant at the 1% level, and the value of the coefficient is stable. 
Columns (3)–(6) include the policy variables (frequency of collection, door-to-door 
collection, UBP, and inter-municipal cooperation). The preferred specification is Column 
(6), which includes municipal-specific variables and all policy variables.  We find that 
the CPRL dummy is, again, positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
estimate implies that CPRL implementation is associated with an increase in the recycling 
output of plastic packaging waste by 1.41 kg per capita. 
Comparing the influence on the amount of recycling, the influence of CPRL is larger 
than that of other policies. The estimated coefficient on the frequency of curbside 
collection is 0.44 and statistically significant at the 1% level, as shown in Column (3). As 
expected, there is a positive relationship between the frequency of collection and the 
quantity of recycled plastic packaging waste. In Column (4), the coefficient on door-to-
door collection is also positive, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
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estimate implies that door-to-door collection is associated with an increase in the 
recycling volume of plastic packaging waste by approximately 1.39 kg per capita. In 
Column (5), the UBP positively influences the recycling volume, but the effect is not 
statistically significant. In Column (6), implementing inter-municipal cooperation is 
associated with a 0.27 kg per capita increase in the recycling volume of plastic packaging 
waste, but the effect is not statistically significant.  
Table 5 reports the estimation results for plastic bottle recycling. Column (6) indicates 
that CPRL implementation is associated with approximately a 0.1 kg per capita increase 
in the recycling volume of plastic bottles. These results suggest that CPRL 
implementation can increase the amount of recycled plastic waste in municipalities, even 
when plastic bottles are traded to recyclers for a reverse fee. The results of the policy 
variables for plastic bottles are similar to the results for plastic packaging waste. In 
Column (3), the estimated coefficient on the frequency of curbside collection is 0.055, 
which is statistically significant at the 1% level. In Column (4), the estimate implies that 
the coefficient on door-to-door collection has a positive sign but is statistically 
insignificant. In Column (5), the coefficient on UBP also has a positive sign but is 
statistically insignificant. In Column (6), the estimated coefficient of inter-municipal 
cooperation in the recycling process is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
We find that inter-municipal cooperation increases the amount of plastic bottle recycling 
by 0.25 kg per capita. 
 
IV estimates (Benchmark results) 
 
For the second part of the analysis, we employ an IV strategy to address the 
endogeneity of the CPRL policy. The regressions in Tables 4 and 5 assume that the error 
term is uncorrelated with the CPRL dummy. However, as we explained, municipalities 
that anticipate an upward trend in their plastic waste volume may be particularly willing 
to commit to CPRL implementation, so the OLS estimates will be biased away from zero.  
Tables 6 and 7 show the estimation results of IV regressions using the CPRL 
implementation rate in the previous year in the prefecture to which each municipality 
belongs as an instrumental variable. In all specifications, we report the results of 
diagnostics to check the validity of our IV strategy. To test whether our instrumental 
variable can be legitimately excluded from the estimated equation, we test its validity 
using the Kleibergen-Paap test for weak identification, eliminating the concern that the 
instrumental variable is weakly correlated with the explanatory variable (Stock et al. 
2002; Stock and Yogo 2005). The values of the F statistics reported across the table are 
well above the Stock-Yogo critical values indicating a strong correlation between the 
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instrumental variable and endogenous variable.8 Additionally, the Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic on the instrument for the test for weak identification is also significantly large. 
Further, we test the under-identification using Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistics to 
determine whether the excluded instruments have relevance and correlate with the 
endogenous regressor. The null hypothesis is that the instrumental variable is invalid, and 
the excluded instruments cannot be excluded from the estimated equation. In all models, 
the reported p-values of the LM test show that the joint null hypothesis that the instrument 
is invalid can be rejected at the 1% significance level, suggesting that the instrumental 
variable is correctly excluded.  
Table 6 presents the results for plastic packaging waste recycling. The CPRL dummy 
continues to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all models. 
Compared to the OLS estimates presented in Table 4, the IV regressions change the 
estimated CPRL effects to a greater degree. The CPRL increases the amount of recycling 
plastic packaging waste by approximately 3.0–3.9 kg per capita, which is larger than other 
policies. Table 7 presents the results for plastic bottle recycling. The coefficients of CPRL 
are positive and statistically significant in all models. As shown in Column (6), CPRL 
increases plastic bottle recycling by approximately 0.49 kg per capita, which is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The finding that the IV estimates are larger than 
the OLS estimates shows endogeneity bias leading to an underestimation of the 
relationship between CPRL implementation and the recycling volume of plastic waste in 
the OLS estimation. In summary, our benchmark IV regressions suggest that CPRL has 
a measurable positive effect on the amount of plastic waste recycling, indicating that the 
policy works as intended. 
 
The impact of subsidies on plastic waste recycling 
 
For the third part of the analysis, we assess the effect of subsidies for municipalities on 
the amount of recycling. In 2008, the Japanese government implemented an amendment 
to CPRL, which allows municipalities to obtain subsidies based on the recycling volume 
and the quality of collected plastic waste. To capture this effect, we use the variable 
regarding subsidy paid in accordance with the recycling volume and the quality of 
collected waste for each local government. The equation now becomes 
 
!!#$ =	#%JKL!,#,$.% + #&*+,-!,$ +	#'A/065!,$ + #(3,4!,$ + #)<=+>!,#,$ +	#*?@%!,$
+	#+*AA=!,#,$ + #,$AAB+!,$ + 5! + 6$ + 7!,$ ,																																												(4) 
 
where	JKL!,#,$.% is the value of the subsidy paid per capita in the previous year. The 
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hypothesis is that the municipalities that received more subsidies in the previous year 
would achieve more plastic waste recycling. Other variables include municipal control 
variables and policy variables, which correspond to the variable in equation (2). 5! is the 
municipality fixed effect,  6$ is the year fixed effect, and 7!$ is the error term. 
Table 8 shows the estimation results for plastic packaging waste and plastic bottles. 
All six regressions include municipality fixed effects and year fixed effects. Columns (1) 
and (4) do not include any control variables. Columns (2) and (5) include municipal 
control variables, and Columns (3) and (6) include the policy variables.  
Columns (1)–(3) report the results for plastic packaging waste. The coefficient on the 
subsidy variable has a positive sign and is statistically significant in all models. These 
results indicate that implementing a subsidy policy on plastic packaging waste recycling 
encourages recycling among the municipalities. For instance, the coefficient in the third 
column implies that a subsidy of 1000 yen (9.05 US$) per capita to the municipality 
increases plastic packaging waste recycling by approximately 2 kg per capita.  
For plastic bottles, Columns (4)–(6) show that the estimated coefficients on the subsidy 
variable are positive but statistically insignificant in all models. Thus, we do not find 
statistically significant evidence that a subsidy to municipalities for plastic bottle 
recycling increases the amount of recycling. This is to be expected, as subsidies for plastic 
bottle recycling are quite low. Indeed, the average subsidy for recycling plastic bottles 
was only 1.1 yen (0.01 US$) per capita from 2009 to 2018, while that for recycling plastic 





Alternative IV strategy: Geographical neighbouring relationships 
 
In the remaining analysis, we aim to demonstrate the robustness of our results by 
applying alternative IV strategies. First, we use the spatial weight of CPRL 
implementation based on the actual neighbouring relationships between municipalities as 
an alternative definition of the neighbouring municipalities for the instrumental variable. 
This instrumental variable is motivated by a study by Usui et al. (2015), who found that 
a municipality’s implementation of recyclable collection or separation programs shows 
spatial interactions with its neighbouring municipalities in Japan. Using this alternative 
IV strategy, the selection equation takes the following form: 
 
$%&'!,#,$ = NO$%&'-,#,$.% + FG!,$ + 5! + 6$ + 7!,$ ,																																																		(5) 
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where O$%&'-,#,$.% is a weighted average of CPRL implementation for waste type w in 
other geographical neighbouring municipalities j in year t-1. The spatial weight matrix 







		,							4!-(Q, R = 1,2, … , T; Q ≠ R)																																																														(6)				 
 
where cij takes the value of 1 when municipalities i and j are contiguous, and 0 otherwise. 
The spatial weight matrix W is based on the actual neighbouring relationships between 
municipalities using queen-type contiguity. The vector I!,$  contains other potential 
variables that correspond to the variable in the second-stage regression (as mentioned 
previously). 5! is the municipality fixed effect, 6$ is the year fixed effect, and 7!$ is the 
error term. 
Table 9 shows the results for plastic packaging waste and plastic bottles. Panel A 
reports the first-stage results. In Columns (1) and (4), the coefficient on the weighted 
average of the CPRL implementation is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The estimated coefficient of CPRL is stable with the municipality-specific control 
variables in Columns (2) and (5). Moreover, in Columns (3) and (6), the weighted average 
of CPRL implementation remains statistically significant at the 1% level. In all models, 
the F-statistics of Kleibergen-Paap and Cragg-Donald Wald on the instrument to test 
weak identification are significantly large, indicating a strong correlation between the 
instrumental variable and the endogenous variable. Additionally, the reported p-values of 
the LM statistic for under-identification show that the joint null hypothesis that the 
instruments are invalid can be rejected at the 1% significance level. These results indicate 
that CPRL implementation in the municipality tends to be influenced by neighbouring 
municipalities, which is in line with our benchmark IV regressions. Panel B reports the 
second-stage results. The CPRL dummy variable continues to be positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in all models. This IV strategy yields estimates of the CPRL 
effect close to the benchmark IV estimates.  
 
Alternative IV strategy: Intensity of CPRL policy 
 
As a further robustness check, we use the intensity of CPRL policy in neighbouring 
municipalities as an instrumental variable. Four types of waste are subject to CPRL—
plastic packaging waste, plastic bottles, glass bottles, and paper packaging containers—
and each municipality has the option to apply CPRL to each type of waste. It is expected 
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that a municipality would be more likely to implement CPRL if the neighbouring 
municipalities are proactive in implementing CPRL and adopting it for various types of 
waste. In the first-stage regression, the following specification is estimated: 
 
$%&'!,#,$ = WO3,X+,--,$.% + FG!,$ + 5! + 6$ + 7!,$ ,																																																				(7) 
 
where O3,X+,--,$.% is a weighted average of the number of types of waste for which 
CPRL is adopted in other geographical neighbouring municipalities j in year t-1. The 
spatial weight matrix W is based on the actual neighbouring relationships between 
municipalities using queen-type contiguity (as mentioned previously). As mentioned 
previously, the vector I!,$  contains other potential variables that correspond to the 
variable in the second-stage regression. 5! is the municipality fixed effect, 6$ is the year 
fixed effect, and 7!$ is the error term. 
The results are summarised in Table 10. In Panel A, the first-stage results show that 
municipalities’ adoption of CPRL is more likely to be affected by the more positive CPRL 
adoption by neighbouring municipalities. The F-statistics of Kleibergen-Paap and Cragg-
Donald Wald are significantly large. Moreover, the LM-statistic for under-identification 
is statistically significant at the 1% level in all models, suggesting that the joint null 
hypothesis that the instruments are invalid can be rejected. In the second-stage results in 
Panel B, we find that CPRL positively affects the amount of plastic packaging waste 




Finally, for completeness, we check the robustness of our findings using a placebo test. 
Additionally, we assess the spillover effect of an environmental policy intervention on 
the recycling activity in municipal governments. Ek and Miliute-Plepiene (2018) found a 
positive spillover effect from policy interventions such as the implementation of food 
waste collection on the amount of packaging waste in households. In the present study, 
to test whether waste management policy interventions have spillover effects on recycling 
in the public sector, we estimate the effect of CPRL on the recycling volume of other 
recyclable waste (e.g. metals, cloth, and fertiliser), which is not subject to the CPRL 
policy.  
The results are reported in Table B in Appendix B. In all models, the coefficient on the 
CPRL dummy variable is statistically insignificant for the recycling volume of other 
waste, supporting the main specification. The other policy variables for plastic packaging 
waste and plastic bottles do not affect the recycling volume of other recyclable waste. 
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This study investigated the impact of CPRL, which is designed to encourage 
municipalities to recycle plastic waste. Using IV strategy and panel datasets from 2007 
to 2018 for all Japanese municipalities, we investigated whether the central government’s 
policy aimed at municipal governments increase the volume of plastic waste recycling, 
post-collection. The results show that CPRL increases the recycling volume of plastic 
packaging waste by 3.1–3.9 kg per capita and that of plastic bottles by 0.4–0.5 kg per 
capita. The results also show that even if collected plastic bottles are traded for a reverse 
fee, CPRL increases the recycling volume by municipalities, suggesting that 
municipalities responded to the subsidies and incentives by increasing their recycling 
efforts. These results are robust to other IV strategies and various controls, including the 
existence of other policies and regional factors. Additionally, this study provides new 
insights into the impact of recycling policy based on EPR on the recycling volume of 
plastic waste at the waste management stage in municipalities. These findings are 
significant, given the growing concerns about proper recycling and disposal of plastics in 
many countries. 
This study highlights the effects of central government intervention on the motivation 
for domestic recycling among municipal governments. In principle, this study has at least 
two policy implications. First, central governments need to be proactive in encouraging 
recycling in municipalities, in addition to promoting policies aimed directly at inhabitants. 
Our empirical results indicate that recycling policies aimed at municipalities are more 
effective for plastic waste recycling than those aimed at inhabitants. In many countries, 
governments implement policies with regulations and incentives that impact residents’ 
recycling motivations and behaviours, and the effects of these policies have been verified 
in many studies. However, these recycling policies are not always desirable for local 
governments, which are financially responsible for waste management. In that sense, the 
lack of increase in the amount of waste recycled after collection might be attributed to the 
uncoordinated regulations of the central government.  
Second, it might be necessary to offer financial incentives to municipalities to increase 
the domestic recycling of plastic waste. Our results suggest that subsidies for plastic bottle 
recycling do not increase domestic recycling volume because the subsidies are quite low. 
Indeed, in the Japanese context, used plastic bottle exports amounted to approximately 
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half (3.07 million tons) of the generated plastic bottles in 2019 (Council for PET Bottle 
Recycling 2019). These results show that municipalities that do not benefit from the 
recycling of plastic waste may need financial support for recycling management and 
running costs to increase recycling volume.  
There are some limitations of this study and avenues for future research. First, because 
of difficulties in data availability on the disposal and recycling costs of plastic waste, this 
study focuses on the recycling volume of plastic waste; thus, future work should 
investigate the consequences for CPRL on the cost-benefit of plastic recycling. Second, 
this study focuses on the effects of CPRL on plastic recycling at the waste management 
stage in municipal governments. Under the CPRL based on EPR, the producer that 
manufactures, uses, or imports containers and packaging is obliged to pay commissioning 
fees based on their production output for recycling; thus, it may be efficient to improve 
the eco-design of their products (Runkel 2003; Brouillat and Oltra 2012). Therefore, it 
would be of great interest to find the impact of CPRL based on EPR on the eco-design 
and use of recycled plastic products at the manufacturing stage, and whether these impacts 
will increase the amount of recycling at the waste management stage. Further research is 
needed to understand how EPR might affect the reduction of recycling cost and the plastic 







1 Local governments in Japan have two tiers: prefectural governments and municipalities (cities, towns, 
and villages). As of January 2021, Japan had 47 prefectures and 1,718 municipalities. 
2 According to the Glass Bottle 3R Promotion Association’s website (in Japanese). 
3 According to the Paper Recycling Promotion Center’s website (in Japanese).  
4 In Japan, MSW is collected and disposed of by local municipalities, whereas industrial waste is usually 
collected and disposed of by private companies.  
5 For details on the guidelines, refer to Japan Containers and Packaging Recycling Association (2020). 
6 As of 2 April 2021, 1,000 Japanese yen was approximately 9.05 US dollars. 
7 An additional 139 (approximately 7%) municipalities merged between 2007 and 2018. The pre-merger 
data for these 139 municipalities were aggregated to the 51 post-merger municipal units. 
8 Stock et al. (2002) suggest that an instrument is not weak if the F-statistic exceeds 10%. 
9 The average subsidy for recycling plastic bottles and plastic packaging waste was calculated by the 
reports of Japan Containers and Packaging Recycling Association (n.d.)  
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Appendix A 
Table A shows the estimation results for glass bottles in Panel (a) and paper containers in Panel (b). In Panel 
(a), the coefficient on the CPRL dummy is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all models. 
The estimate implies that CPRL implementation for glass bottles is associated with an increase in the recycling 
volume of glass bottles by 0.48–0.50 kg per capita. Column (6) indicates that the inter-municipal cooperation 
variable increases plastic bottle recycling by approximately 0.59 kg per capita, which is larger than that of the 
CPRL policy. On the other hand, in Panel (b), the CPRL for paper containers does not have an impact on 
recycling volume. This is because fewer municipalities are implementing CPRL for paper containers. As of 
2018, the rate of CPRL implementation for paper containers was only 8%, and it has remained nearly unchanged 
for over a decade. 
 
Table A (a): Estimation results for glass bottles 
 Glass bottles 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.   
CPRL 0.497 *** 0.501 *** 0.493 *** 0.489 *** 0.482 *** 0.460 ** 
 (0.187)  (0.186)  (0.186)  (0.186)  (0.186)  (0.183)  
Freq     0.071  0.080  0.080  0.082  
     (0.053)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.052)  
Door       -0.512  -0.529  -0.531  
       (0.327)  (0.326)  (0.326)  
UBP         0.201  0.195  
         (0.143)  (0.141)  
Coope           0.594 *** 
           (0.167)  
Intercept 5.853 *** 6.698 *** 6.581 *** 6.598 *** 6.487 *** 6.404 *** 
 (0.136)  (0.983)  (0.986)  (0.985)  (0.988)  (0.938)  
Control variables No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Municipal fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-statistic 29.00  24.23  22.77  21.51  20.30  19.39  
Obs. 20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616   
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
municipal level. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. The control variables include the population 
density, the share of older people, and the average income per inhabitant. 
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Table A (b): Estimation results for paper packaging containers 
 Paper packaging containers 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  
CPRL -0.357  -0.367  -0.537  -0.538  -0.540  -0.533  
 (0.457)  (0.453)  (0.438)  (0.438)  (0.438)  (0.434)  
Freq     0.364 *** 0.366 *** 0.366 *** 0.367 *** 
     (0.077)  (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.082)  
Door       -0.079  -0.077  -0.078  
       (0.379)  (0.381)  (0.381)  
UBP         -0.194  -0.194  
         (0.147)  (0.147)  
Coope           -0.041  
           (0.131)  
Intercept 1.355 *** 2.692 ** 2.048 * 2.050 * 2.160 * 2.165 * 
 (0.058)  (1.117)  (1.097)  (1.098)  (1.104)  (1.103)  
Control variables No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Municipal fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-statistic 3.18  2.75  4.59  4.48  4.24  4.02  
Obs. 20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
municipal level. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. The control variables include the population 





Table B: Estimation results for other recyclable waste (not subject to CPRL policy) 
 Other recyclable waste (not subject to CPRL policy) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)  
  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.   Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  
CPRL (for Plastic packaging waste) 0.766  0.887  1.743         
 (1.279)  (1.250)  (1.523)         
CPRL (for Plastic bottles)        1.133  1.324  1.820  
        (1.452)  (1.410)  (1.593)  
Freq (for Plastic packaging waste)     -0.327         
     (0.406)         
Door (for Plastic packaging waste)     2.162         
     (2.556)         
Freq (for Plastic bottles)            -0.273  
            (0.507)  
Door (for Plastic bottles)            3.911  
            (4.027)  
UBP     -9.951       -10.048  
     (8.580)       (8.562)  
Coope     -1.351       -1.151  
     (1.447)       (1.501)  
Intercept 54.861 *** 40.428 * 46.232 ***  54.554 *** 40.103 * 45.955 *** 
 (1.192)  (20.858)  (16.889)   (1.374)  (20.856)  (16.654)  
Control variables No  Yes  Yes   No  Yes  Yes  
Municipal fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-statistic 3.27  4.52  3.56   2.92  4.34  3.52  
Obs. 20,616  20,616  20,616   20,616  20,616  20,616  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipal 
level. All regressions include municipality and year fixed effects. The control variables include the population density, the share of 
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Figure 1: CPRL implementation across Japanese municipalities in 2018 
(a) Plastic packaging waste 
 
(b) Plastic bottle 
 
Note: This figure depicts the state of CPRL adoption in municipalities as of 2018. Panel (a) shows the state of CPRL 
adoption for plastic packaging waste, and Panel (b) shows the state of CPRL adoption for plastic bottles. This figure 
was created using information from Japan Containers and Packaging Recycling Association on CPRL. 
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Figure 2: The rate of CPRL implementation among Japanese municipalities 
 
Note: This figure depicts the trend of yearly rate of municipalities adopting CPRL of plastic packaging waste (solid 
line) and plastic bottles (dashed line). Plastic packaging waste has been included in the CPRL since 2000. The trend 
in the adoption rate of CPRL decreased significantly in 2005 because of municipal mergers. This figure was created 
using information from Japan Containers and Packaging Recycling Association on CPRL. 
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Figure 3: CPRL adoption and recycling volume 
 
Note: The graphs show the differences between CPRL-implementing and -non-implementing municipalities’ average 
recycling volume per capita for plastic packaging waste (Panel a), plastic bottles (Panel b), glass bottles (Panel c), 
and paper containers (Panel d). The graphs also show fitted linear regression lines with 95% confidence intervals. 
The y-axis describes the amount of recycling output per capita, and the x-axis describes the dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 for municipalities implementing CPRL. Regression coefficients and robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Plastic packaging waste: 1.769*** (0.163); Plastic bottles: 0.159** (0.06); Glass bottles: 0.178 (0.190); 
Paper containers: -0.327 (0.460). 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
  Variable Units Average SD Min Max 
Plastic packaging 
waste 
Recycling volume kg/capita/year 3.644 4.820 0.000 37.001 
CPRL dummy 0.585 0.493 0.000 1.000 
Subsidy 1000yen/kg/capita 19.652 47.862 0.000 1812.175 
Frequency times/month 1.922 1.852 0.000 7.000 
Door-to-door dummy 0.030 0.169 0.000 1.000 
Pref % 56.895 18.391 4.000 93.900 
PET bottle 
Recycling volume kg/capita/year 2.119 1.422 0.000 36.145 
CPRL dummy 0.668 0.471 0.000 1.000 
Subsidy 1000yen/kg/capita 0.743 1.459 0.000 52.701 
Frequency times/month 2.123 1.390 0.000 7.000 
Door-to-door dummy 0.053 0.224 0.000 1.000 
Pref % 65.467 22.041 0.000 100.000 
 UBP dummy 0.585 0.493 0.000 1.000 
 Cooperation dummy 0.218 0.413 0.000 1.000 
 Density capita/100km2 8.620 17.645 0.000 141.409 
 Over 65 years old % 28.523 7.599 0.000 100.000 
  Income hundred thousand yen 27.972 4.296 18.890 113.329 
Note: SD, standard deviation. There are a total of 20,616 observations (which correspond to all 1,718 municipalities over 




Table 2: First-stage results for plastic packaging waste (explaining the implementation of CPRL) 
 Plastic packaging waste 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  
Pref (lag) 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 
 (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  
Freq     0.079 *** 0.078 *** 0.078 *** 0.074 *** 
     (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
Door       0.012  0.012  -0.003  
       (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.034)  
UBP         0.009  0.009  
         (0.011)  (0.011)  
Coope           0.195 *** 
           (0.015)  
Control variables No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Municipal fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-statistic 348.36  344.41  268.500  268.18  267.45  237.69  
Obs. 20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. All regressions include municipality 




Table 3: First-stage results for plastic bottles (explaining the implementation of CPRL) 
 Plastic bottles 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  
Pref (lag) 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 
 (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  
Freq     0.018 *** 0.018 *** 0.017 *** 0.016 *** 
     (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
Door       -0.015  -0.020  -0.017  
       (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  
UBP         0.045 *** 0.044 *** 
         (0.011)  (0.011)  
Coope           0.085 *** 
           (0.014)  
Control variables No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Municipal fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-statistic 261.44  255.78  254.700  254.69  254.78  250.55  
Obs. 20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. All regressions include municipality 
and year fixed effects. The control variables include the population density, the share of older people, and the average income per inhabitant. 
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Table 4: Estimation results by OLS (plastic packaging waste) 
 Plastic packaging waste 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.   
CPRL 1.997 *** 1.987 *** 1.458 *** 1.455 *** 1.452 *** 1.416 *** 
 (0.164)  (0.163)  (0.156)  (0.157)  (0.157)  (0.157)  
Freq     0.448 *** 0.426 *** 0.422 *** 0.419 *** 
     (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.053)  
Door       1.391 ** 1.375 ** 1.355 ** 
       (0.616)  (0.615)  (0.617)  
UBP         0.273  0.272  
         (0.217)  (0.217)  
Coope           0.271  
           (0.180)  
Intercept 2.367 *** 2.347 *** 2.072 ** 2.055 ** 1.906 ** 1.887 ** 
 (0.109)  (0.850)  (0.811)  (0.814)  (0.825)  (0.816)  
Control variables No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Municipal fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-statistic 17.440  14.830  19.110  18.040  17.800  17.180  
Obs. 20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616   
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. All regressions include 




Table 5: Estimation results by OLS (plastic bottles) 
 Plastic bottles 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  
CPRL 0.125 ** 0.131 ** 0.122 ** 0.122 ** 0.122 ** 0.106 * 
 (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.061)  (0.061)  (0.060)  
Freq     0.055 *** 0.056 *** 0.056 *** 0.053 *** 
     (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017)  
Door       0.201  0.201  0.210  
       (0.172)  (0.172)  (0.171)  
UBP         0.001  -0.001  
         (0.047)  (0.047)  
Coope           0.251 *** 
           (0.058)  
Intercept 2.203 *** 2.316 *** 2.240 *** 2.228 *** 2.228 *** 2.200 *** 
 (0.045)  (0.526)  (0.523)  (0.521)  (0.527)  (0.519)  
Control variables No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Municipal fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-statistic 13.34  11.25  11.19  10.57  9.98  9.96  
Obs. 20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. All regressions include municipality 
and year fixed effects. The control variables include the population density, the share of older people, and the average income per inhabitant. 
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Table 6: Estimation results by IV regressions (plastic packaging waste) 
 Plastic packaging waste 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  
CPRL 3.915 *** 3.783 *** 3.155 *** 3.124 *** 3.079 *** 3.107 *** 
 (0.444)  (0.442)  (0.520)  (0.519)  (0.520)  (0.562)  
Freq     0.307 *** 0.289 *** 0.288 *** 0.288 *** 
     (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.057)  
Door       1.363 *** 1.349 *** 1.354 *** 
       (0.344)  (0.343)  (0.343)  
UBP         0.247 * 0.247 * 
         (0.139)  (0.139)  
Coope           -0.080  
           (0.170)  
Control variables No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Municipal fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-statistic 12.42  11.88  28.74  27.80  27.36  28.79  
Weak-ID test Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 348.36  344.41  268.5  268.18  267.45  237.690  
Weak-ID test Cragg-Donald F-stat 662.43  657.72  504.55  504.20  501.87  445.400  
Under-ID test LM stat 320.169 *** 315.488 *** 250.515 *** 250.261 *** 249.698 *** 222.767 *** 
Obs. 20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. All regressions include municipality and 
year fixed effects. The control variables include the population density, the share of older people, and the average income per inhabitant.  
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Table 7: Estimation results by IV regressions (plastic bottles) 
 Plastic bottles 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  
CPRL 0.462 ** 0.547 *** 0.532 *** 0.533 *** 0.532 *** 0.497 ** 
 (0.194)  (0.204)  (0.205)  (0.205)  (0.205)  (0.207)  
Freq     0.048 *** 0.048 *** 0.049 *** 0.047 *** 
     (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)  
Door       0.208 * 0.210 * 0.216 * 
       (0.113)  (0.114)  (0.114)  
UBP         -0.017  -0.018  
         (0.034)  (0.034)  
Coope           0.215 *** 
           (0.035)  
Control variables No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Municipal fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-statistic 13.45  13.40  14.85  14.01  13.23  16.02  
Weak-ID test Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 261.44  255.78  254.7  254.69  254.78  250.55  
Weak-ID test Cragg-Donald F-stat 581.32  566.81  562.03  561.92  564.64  550.85  
Under-ID test LM stat 235.879 *** 231.261 *** 230.580 *** 230.582 *** 230.868 *** 227.711 *** 
Obs. 20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  20,616  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. All regressions include municipality and 




Table 8: Estimation results for subsidies on plastic waste recycling 
 Plastic packaging waste  Plastic bottles 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)  
  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.   Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  
Sub (lag) 2.426 *** 2.392 *** 1.943 **  3.978  3.324  1.904  
 (0.890  (0.883)  (0.839)   (12.072)  (11.994)  (11.918)  
Freq     0.367 ***      0.049 ** 
     (0.055)       (0.019)  
Door     1.831 **      0.134  
     (0.804)       (0.186)  
UBP     0.542 **      0.026  
     (0.213)       (0.058)  
Coope     0.653 ***      0.244 *** 
     (0.185)       (0.069)  
Intercept 3.283 *** 3.148 *** 2.130 **  2.025 *** 2.707 *** 2.560 *** 
 (0.066)  (1.093)  (0.998)   (0.030)  (0.527)  (0.534)  
Control variables No  Yes  Yes   No  Yes  Yes  
Municipal fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-statistic 3.48  3.02  7.12   16.40  13.13  10.79  
Obs. 17,180  17,180  17,180   17,180  17,180  17,180  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. All regressions include municipality and year 
fixed effects. There are a total of 17,180 observations (which correspond to all 1,718 municipalities over ten years) in this analysis because the subsidy policy for municipalities on the 
amount of recycling began in 2008. The control variables include the population density, the share of older people, and the average income per inhabitant. 
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Table 9: Estimation results for the alternative IV strategy (geographically neighbouring relationships) 
 Plastic packaging waste   Plastic bottles 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)  
  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.   Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  
Panel A: First stage (Introduction of CPRL) 
WCPRL (lag) 0.378 *** 0.377 *** 0.282 ***  0.320 *** 0.317 *** 0.304 *** 
 (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.019)   (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  
Control variables No  Yes  Yes   No  Yes  Yes  
Policy variables No  No  Yes   No  No  Yes  
Municipal fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-statistic 347.84  343.59  228.04   245.93  241.40  229.85  
Panel B: Second stage (Recycling volume) 
CPRL 3.136 *** 2.994 *** 1.868 ***  0.533 *** 0.609 *** 0.515 *** 
 (0.407)  (0.405)  (0.540)   (0.177)  (0.179)  (0.184)  
Freq     0.384 ***      0.047 *** 
     (0.055)       (0.010)  
Door     1.355 ***      0.217 * 
     (0.341)       (0.113)  
UBP     0.266 *      -0.018  
     (0.139)       (0.032)  
Coope     0.177       0.214 *** 
     (0.162)       (0.034)  
Control variables No  Yes  Yes   No  Yes  Yes  
Municipal fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-statistic 12.49  11.60  28.50   14.66  13.93  16.49  
Weak-ID test Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 347.84  343.59  228.04   245.93  241.4  229.800  
Weak-ID test Cragg-Donald F-stat 1050.24  1038.94  621.57   813.53  791.09  722.390  
Under-ID test LM stat 300.844 *** 299.758 *** 216.314 ***  207.427 *** 205.299 *** 201.146 *** 
Obs. 20,616  20,616  20,616   20,616  20,616  20,616  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. All regressions include 
municipality and year fixed effects. The control variables include the population density, the share of older people, and the average income per inhabitant.  
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Table 10: Estimation results for the alternative IV strategy (intensity of CPRL policy) 
 Plastic packaging waste   Plastic bottles 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)  
  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.   Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  
Panel A: First stage (Introduction of CPRL) 
WIntense (lag) 0.508 *** 0.506 *** 0.335 ***  0.432 *** 0.425 *** 0.387 *** 
 (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.032)   (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.032)  
Control variables No  Yes  Yes   No  Yes  Yes  
Policy variables No  No  Yes   No  No  Yes  
Municipal fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-statistic 219.86  216.00  110.08   170.58  166.75  143.85  
Panel B: Second stage (Recycling volume) 
CPRL 3.936 *** 3.721 *** 2.608 ***  1.001 *** 1.136 *** 0.960 *** 
 (0.538)  (0.535)  (0.806)   (0.229)  (0.236)  (0.254)  
Freq     0.327 ***      0.039 *** 
     (0.072)       (0.011)  
Door     1.354 ***      0.225 * 
     (0.342)       (0.115)  
UBP     0.254 *      -0.037  
     (0.139)       (0.033)  
Coope     0.023       0.173 *** 
     (0.209)       (0.038)  
Control variables No  Yes  Yes   No  Yes  Yes  
Municipal fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  
F-statistic 11.70  11.08  27.91   15.41  13.66  15.82  
Weak-ID test Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 219.859  216.004  110.078   170.584  166.747  143.851  
Weak-ID test Cragg-Donald F-stat 555.099  543.563  256.927   460.301  441.295  355.905  
Under-ID test LM stat 190.02  189.642  106.339   149.918  149.023  134.479  
Obs. 20,616  20,616  20,616   20,616  20,616  20,616  
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. All regressions include 
municipality and year fixed effects. The control variables include the population density, the share of older people, and the average income per inhabitant. 
